*Disease Diplomacy* by Sara Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott, and Simon Rushton delves into the high politics of global health security. They trace this new disease diplomacy to the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic of 2003. Ever since that time, and indeed long before, political leaders took notice of the security and economic effects of new infections spanning national borders.

The authors\' analysis of international law and governance is compelling---they show a mastery of international relations and new norms ushered in by the revised International Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005. This book came out during the west African Ebola epidemic when the utter failure of global governance---and collapse of global norms---captured public and political attention.

Thinking back to the height of the Ebola outbreak, it is worth remembering its human toll:

""Josephine Finda Sellu lost 15 of her nurses to Ebola in rapid succession and thought about quitting herself. She did not. Ms. Sellu, the deputy nurse matron, is a rare survivor who never stopped toiling at the government hospital here, Sierra Leone\'s biggest death trap for the virus during the dark months of June and July...'There is a need for me to be around,' said Ms. Sellu, 42, who oversees the Ebola nurses. 'I am a senior. All the junior nurses look up to me." If she left, she said, 'the whole thing would collapse'.""

This experience of one brave nurse in Sierra Leone, as reported in *The New York Times,* reminds us that it is the human dimension that matters.

Josephine Sellu and the many other health workers in the west African countries affected by Ebola were confronted by an utter absence of core capacities, which stood in stark contrast with IHR mandates for all countries to build and maintain robust systems to detect and rapidly respond to outbreaks. The IHR similarly require wealthier states to fund capacity gaps in low-income countries. But many states, both rich and poor, largely ignore their international legal obligations. The IHR allows states to "self-assess" and WHO does not demand rigorous independent evaluations.

The IHR neither gives compliance incentives nor imposes sanctions for flouting legal norms. Guinea did not report suspected cases of Ebola virus disease promptly to WHO as required by the IHR. As a result of late reporting, and for political reasons, WHO\'s Director-General did not call a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) until 4 months after Médecins Sans Frontières warned the epidemic was spinning out of control. Rich states and large corporations imposed travel and trade restrictions contrary to WHO recommendations, but the agency imposed no penalty or repercussion. Liberia erected a military-style quarantine in Monrovia against WHO advice. What is going on when the international community flouts the norms of international law that states put in place to ensure global health security?

This is where *Disease Diplomacy* adds enormous value for scholars at the intersection of global health, law, and governance. The authors do much more than provide a systematic description of the IHR. Beyond rich description, they offer innovative solutions on how to make the IHR what its drafters hoped it would be---the international governing instrument for global health security.

The book\'s method of progression is to describe the antecedents to the 2005 revision of the IHR, including the growing political concern with novel circulating viruses, such as avian influenza A H5N1. *Disease Diplomacy* correctly portrays SARS as moving the world from a tipping point to a political cascade. A central claim of the book is that the norms that underpin global health security began to emerge well before the 2005 IHR revision. SARS and H5N1 revealed the rapidly changing expectations about appropriate state behaviour in the face of new infections.

Pandemic influenza A H1N1 became the first formal test of the IHR, with WHO\'s Director-General declaring a PHEIC in 2009. WHO commissioned a report on IHR performance during H1N1, with the IHR Review Committee observing, "the world is ill prepared" for a global pandemic. The World Health Assembly failed to implement most of the commission\'s recommendations, such as for an emergency contingency fund and a global health reserve workforce. However, in light of Ebola, WHO rapidly reconsidered, beginning to implement these and other reforms.

The most contemporarily relevant parts of *Disease Diplomacy* are the final two chapters---the first on the IHR review process, state capacity, and political will; and the second that further explains the authors\' conceptual framework. Before praising the analysis, it\'s worth highlighting one problematic claim in the book. The authors argue that WHO learned its lessons from H1N1, reinforcing new norms and "good state behavior". In fairness, the authors discuss at length "question marks about some countries willingness to comply". Yet today four commissions on global health security in the aftermath of Ebola are coming to similar conclusions: both WHO and its governing instrument, the IHR, failed badly during the recent Ebola outbreak, with states disregarding global norms.

It was the IHR Review Committee in 2011 that proved prescient, highlighting WHO\'s bureaucratic inefficiencies, incoherent communication processes, and the violation of evidence-based recommendations against travel and trade restrictions. *Disease Diplomacy* points to two overriding reasons for state non-adherence to the new norms: lack of political will and lack of capacity. These are the two major aspects of national sovereignty. Will political leaders place collective action at the top of their agenda and will they provide ample funding to build IHR core capacities? Will national sovereignty trump mutual responsibilities for health or will global health crises such as Ebola break the stranglehold of states acting in what they perceive wrongly to be their own national interests?

*Disease Diplomacy* makes a subtle but important point about state internalisation of new norms: that this process requires deep bureaucratic and legislative changes, not simply ratification of a treaty. The authors argue that states are increasingly internalising the norm of prompt disease notification to WHO, but not the norm relating to IHR "additional measures", such as travel and trade restrictions. The world saw the power of this argument during pandemic influenza A H1N1 in 2009 when Mexico and the USA reported promptly, but then saw many states implementing unnecessary and discriminatory travel and trade restrictions.

The book\'s conceptual framework takes the reader on a vivid journey from norm emergence to norm socialisation and norm internalisation. What Ebola showed is that the world is not on track to achieve full internalisation. The authors put the problem nicely, "one false move by WHO...could undermine member states\' faith in the entire global health security regime". That is what happened during the recent Ebola outbreak. *Disease Diplomacy* conveys the lessons of H1N1---lesson that WHO failed to heed. Will the agency and its members make the needed changes after the unconscionable handling of the Ebola epidemic? Perhaps we need to think beyond the sterile framing of global health security. Instead, let\'s constantly remind political leaders about how a brave nurse, Josephine Sellu, suffered, with so many of her patients and colleagues needlessly losing their lives.
